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Abstract  
 
 In the past employee interest and influence have been presented mainly through trade unions and collective 
bargaining (economic regulation). Socially optimal levels of co-determination may be prevented by the 
existence of high fixed costs of establishing councils. Job security can resolve the adverse selection problem 
and raise economic efficiency i.e. worker or agent will work efficiently or socially optimal. Co-
determination reinforces well functioning social democracy, recent studies discover that consultation and 
participation increase than innovativeness of the company. The US and EU approach to employment are 
different under common and civil law, that differ in many ways. The US employment –at- will is liberal 
individualist model, laissez-faire approach and any regulation is considered to be potentially welfare 
reducing. And mandatory employment rights model; EU model that seeks it’s rationale in the previously 
mentioned market failures (agency problems, hold-up problems) caused by asymmetric information and 
incomplete employment contracts, and the presence of monopolies, monopsonies that reduce workers 
mobility. Harmonious relations between” social partners” – labor and management are the aim of the 
European Work Council directive. European law continues to focus on workers and shareholders interest.  
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  In the past employee interest and influence have been presented mainly through trade unions and collective 
bargaining (economic regulation). Mandatory introduction of the European model –statutory support for the 
employee rights to information consultation, and joint decision making through voluntary work councils (1) 
(work regulation) raises questions about what should be the objective, extent and form of employee access to 
and influence on decision making within the firm. (2).Freeman and Lazear (1995) findings suggest that neither 
workers neither employers’ have incentives to voluntary create work councils. The distributional effect will lead 
workers to demand degree of empowerment that exceeds social optimum. Socially optimal levels of co-
determination may be prevented by the existence of high fixed costs of establishing councils (3) As Fitz Roy and 
Kraft (2005) show the effect on co-determination on productivity, job satisfaction variable and efficiency (4). 
Information is the basic resource in decision making (Gospel, Willman 2004).There exists pervasive asymmetry 
of information between the employer and employee. Economic value of the council can be modelled as 
communicator from management to workers. There is a social benefit from good information that maximizes 
the utility of employees and employers. Full information disclosure will enable workers to respond flexibility 
whether firm is in a good or bad state (5). Expected utility of workers; working independently of the state of the 
firm (good or bad) i.e. just working normally is given (6) .Alternatively if workers are 
indifferent between N and F(Normal and Fast) it is defined p* probability as  
lies between 0 and 1 since Exchange of information is legally mandated, work councils can 
enhance  the flow of information from workers to management. Joint consultation becomes communication 
vehicle for management to provide general information about the state of the organization. Employee councils 
have been introduced to a large number of organizations not just to integrate consultative and negotiating 
process but to do “employee” rather than “union” presentation. Increasing size of the employee council can 
improve accuracy of information, work councils’ improve enterprise surplus when they have limited and definite 
power in the enterprise. Information obtained by the union sets must yield higher joint surplus than the 
information’s provided in the disjointed sets. Work councils, are mandated rights over the level of employment, 
employee surplus division, working conditions. On long run this increases the level of job-security. Job-security 
is higher valued work-outcome by the workers according to the study of Clark (2005). Job security can resolve 
the adverse selection problem and raise economic efficiency i.e. worker or agent will work efficiently or socially 
                                                          
1 Works constitution act 1952 and 1972 for work councils in private sector and The personnel representation Act 1974 extended this 
to public sector enterprises  
2 See Appendix 1 Section A ; Table 1 tow way channel work council and trade union  
3 See Appendix 1 Section B ; Firm A weak council ; Firm B no council  
4 See Appendix 1 Section C ; Table 2 Co-determined third parity so-determined and non-codetermined firms and  Section D Table 3 
Cobb Douglas production function  
 
5 See Appendix 1 Section E Gains from information disclosure as a function of p  
6 P % of the time workers are right working normally N and receive utility UN while (1-P) % of the time they are wrong and receive 
utility U0 
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optimal (Akerlof, 1976).Which will reduce the opportunistic or dysfunctional behaviour. Results from an empirical 
study of (Bauer T. 2004) showed that opportunity to participate in decision making, communication with co-
workers have positive impact on the welfare of the employees. What makes the contracts incomplete is the long-
run relationship between principal and agent and element of uncertainty and risk in the relation. If contracts are 
incomplete allocating some control rights to employees may be optimal, as they may be willing to develop firms’ 
specific capital. And on the long run monitoring costs cumulative increase; that is why job security legislation 
should be self-enforcing in other words there will be low cost for litigation. Collective bargaining is based on the 
manifestation of power and counter power between employer association and trade union. Co-determination 
requires limitation of managerial discretion to manage. However some limitation should be placed on the power 
of work councils (Freeman Lazear 1995) .Employee consultation it is legally required, communication through 
joint consultative or works committee on average is increasing(downward and upward communication)(7).Geary 
distinguishes between consultative participation upward communication and delegative  participation i.e. 
participation designed into peoples’ jobs. Co-determination reinforces well functioning social democracy, recent 
studies discover that consultation and participation increase than innovativeness of the company. The study by 
Hubler and Jirjahn(2003) showed that the presence of work councils exerts positive impact on productivity 
within the covered industrial relations regime.  
 
                               
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
π(e*,w*) = F(N),     π (e**,w**) = (1+θ ) F(N) /3,  π (e*,w*) – CB= F(N) – CB,  π (e***,w***) – CB 
NU(e*,w*) = 0         NU(e**,w**) – CW =              NU(e*,w*) = 0                          (1+θ+2a)F(N)/3-CB 
                                 (1+ θ) 2 F(N) /9 – CW                    
                                                                                                                                        NU(e***,w***) –CW= 
                                                                                                                                       (1+θ- a)2 (N) /9 – CW 
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 See Appendix 1 Section F Table 4 Change in communication through representative staff bodies over the previous three years  
 
    Employer  
NO COVERAGE  
(COLLECT=0) 
      COVERAGE  
      (COLLECT=1 ) 
WORKERS  WORKERS  
NO WORK 
COUNCIL  
(WOCO=0) 
NO WORK 
COUNCIL  
(WOCO=0) 
WORK COUNCIL  
         WOCO=1  
WORK COUNCIL  
         WOCO=1  
e-is effort, w-wage; CW-costs; CB-costs; 
Game Tree 
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The employer will be a member of an employers’ association if the cost of coverage the collective agreement are 
offset by the advantage of discouraging the rent seeking behaviour of the work council. A study of Mizrahi, 
Shlomo (2002) argues that firms efficiency, stability and workers participation can be achieved through 
participatory decision rules therefore government intervention is considered to be marginal throughout. Relying 
on the rationales developed by the new-institutional economics   long-run relationships between employer and 
employees are essential for the firms’ existence and stability. This explains the advantages of the social contract 
although efficiency   in the market can be achieved without it but under assumption of perfect competition in the 
market. The firms in capitalist market economies face profit maximising constraint, and high involvement of 
employees to increase their share in the firm’s surplus, leading to inefficiency. From managerial perspective there 
is optimal level of involvement which is not always must be maximum level of involvement (Mizrahi, 2002). 
Economic studies show that economic benefits tend to be higher; the higher the level of participation and where 
there is financial participation through profit sharing and or ownership stakes (Hodgson Jones).Employment law 
is often labelled as either individual i.e the law relating to the employee-employer relationship, or collective i.e. 
relationship between employee, employer and third party, trade union (Hardy, Upex, 2006). The US and EU 
approach to employment are different under common and civil law, that differ in many ways. The US 
employment –at- will is liberal individualist model, laissez-faire approach and any regulation is considered to be 
potentially welfare reducing (Adnett, Hardy, 2005). And mandatory employment rights model; EU model that 
seeks it’s rationale in the previously mentioned market failures (agency problems, hold-up problems) caused by 
asymmetric information and incomplete employment contracts, and the presence of monopolies monopsonies 
that reduce workers mobility. Sources of the law in US/UK are essentially legislation and case law while in EU 
there are treaty provisions, directives and regulations regulating the labour law of the member states. In the 
common law countries the contract of employment about the individual bargaining between employer and 
employee is the core of the employment relationship (Osman, Chris 2001). Civil law jurisdictions are somewhat 
different, employment relationship are regulated by labour code (France) or collective agreements, that contrary 
to market – oriented US model, create neo-corporatist European Social model that establishes diverse non-
waivable worker rights. According to common law employer can be dismissed without reason and has no 
protection against it (Robinson, Fox, 1985). In EU all the member states have the level of protection or 
eligibility if the dismissal is unfair. Corporatist contest the argument that job security legislation and centralized 
co-ordinated bargaining produces hysteresis i.e. downward inflexibility (the Beveridge curve) in the relationship 
between vacancies and unemployment. Some suggest that deregulatory pressures are inevitable in the labour 
market, reflecting the changes in the industrial organization, implying looser organization and dualism, between 
a protected core of multiskilled employees and adjustable periphery of contract workers and an adjustable 
periphery of contract workers in an era of post-Fordist flexibility (Rhodes, 1992). Most EU legislation that 
affects employment law is introduced in the form of directives. Directives are legislative instruments that require 
member state to translate the contents of the directive into national law (Lewis, Sargeant, 2000). European Work 
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Council Directive (EWC) (8) gave embodiment of the European model of representation that covers 
transnational companies that work in EU. The directive’s basic requirement is am establishment of a procedure 
for information and consultation between workers and the firm (Hogler, 1996). Directive avoids any linkage 
between trade unions and representation. Even though directive is transnational in its scope, it contemplates 
decentralized schemes by which parties can make local agreements to satisfy the law. Directive’s policy rationale 
derives from the social charter, social interest are indispensable adjunct to economic project. Social charter 
previously was considered important for workers’ rights protection (Teague, 1993). Central of this philosophy is 
the theme of partnership that is meant to encourage employee commitment, epitomized in German Co-
determination Act (1976), (Morley, Guinnigle, Collings, 2006). Employee rights ,do not include workers right to 
engage in collective bargaining with the employer. Those are the instructive comparisons between US and EU 
law that can be drawn. Harmonious relations between”social partners” – labour and management are the aim of 
the directive. All member states should provide appropriate measures in a case of failure to comply with this 
directive by ensuring administrative and judicial procedures.  The key feature of the legislative strategy behind 
the transnational character that transnational character of the bodies that directive promotes has enabled 
commission to apply the principle of mutual recognition of member states existing national systems of employee 
representation (Hall, 1992). Workplace democracy has impact upon economic efficiency which is in line with the 
Lisbon Strategy (2000) and social agenda of establishing interaction between economic employment and social 
policy. The system of codetermination restricts freedom of establishment of foreign corporations; this 
restriction is justified under imperative requirements doctrine. European law continues to focus on workers and 
shareholders interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in 
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 
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Appendix 1 Section A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 Channels of presentation; two channels work council and Trade Union 
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Appendix 1 Section B   
                               A  
 
 Fig 1 A firm establishes weak council X* is social optimum that maximizes joint surplus, workers will 
choose Xw, short changing the interest of capital. 
                               B  
 
 
 
 B Firm establishes no council; here C denotes fixed costs to works councils- time and preparation 
for                             the elections  
 
R
X
R(X)-C
1-t(x) R(x)- c 
R0
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Appendix 1 Section C Table 2 Co-determined third parity so-determined and non-codetermined firms 
Descriptive statistis 1972-1976 and 1981-1985 
Variable  
Co-determined 
firms                      
(N=65)      
Third parity co-
determined firms      
(N=61) 
Non co-
determined firms                                
(N=53) 
1972-1976                    COD                                      
=1 if employment is > 2000 1 0 0 
LABOUR                                 Number 
of employees  
17586                                           
(26926) 
1137                  
(547)  
321                                 
(126)  
Capital                                       Total 
capital stock in TDM (thpousands of 
deutche marks)  
1320188                                                 
(2187755) 
65906                
(40753) 
16949                              
(12092)  
MAT                                             
material input in TDM  
963477                                    
(1631943) 
46217            
(51503) 
14674                    
(10618) 
SALES                                   total 
volume in TDM  
1879424                         
(3096734) 
95906               
(64853) 
28248                    
(16677) 
OVER                                      Average 
number of overtime hours per week and 
worker at industry level  
2.30                                        
(0.94) 
2.44               
(1.03) 
2.57                          
(1.20) 
CONC                                         
percentage market share of the six largest 
firms in the industry  
33.58                                
(18.88) 
22.80                 
(15.06) 
21.65               
(16.72) 
IMP (value of imported goods relative 
to/total production)  
0.17                                       
(0.11) 
0.19               
(0.12) 
0.22                   
(0.17) 
EXP(value of exported goods to total 
sales volume)  
0.33                           
(0.10) 
0.30                   
(0.06) 
0.30                 
(0.12) 
1981-1985                    COD                                      
=1 if employment is > 2000 1 0 0 
LABOUR                                 Number 
of employees  
18918           
(37834) 
1100                     
(450) 
315                      
(117) 
Capital                                       Total 
capital stock in TDM (thpousands of 
deutche marks)  
2246018                        
(3865700) 
117990              
(89117) 
28904               
(22076) 
MAT                                             
material input in TDM  
2082503                   
(3862749) 
90468                
(98639)                             
30746              
(43039) 
SALES                                   total 
volume in TDM  
3729622                  
(6706128) 
175726            
(130640) 
53270              
(48942) 
OVER                                      Average 
number of overtime hours per week and 
worker at industry level  
1.43                                       
(0.59) 
1.57                       
(0.63) 
1.71                     
(0.79) 
CONC                                         
percentage market share of the six largest 
firms in the industry  
33.43                                   
(18.65) 
23.55                 
(15.37) 
23.30                
(16.95) 
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IMP (value of imported goods relative 
to/total production)  
0.25                                       
(0.16) 
0.28                 
(0.19) 
0.34                    
(0.22) 
EXP(value of exported goods to total 
sales volume)  
0.44                        
(0.17) 
0.42                       
(0.18) 
0.42                       
(0.18) 
mean values(standard deviation in parentheses) 
Appendix 1 Section D Table 3 Cobb-Douglass Production function  
Period variable 
Hausmann Taylor                          
1972-76                                       
1981-85
Random effects            
1972-76                               
1981-85 
Constant variable 3.17 (11.12) 2.51 (20.42)
COD 0.24 (4.06) 0.005 (0.22)
COD 80 0.06 (3.48) 0.04 (2.84)
lnN 0.27 (6.49) 0.29 (14.11)
lnK 0.27 (5.82) 0.27 (8.12)
lnMAT 0.32 (5.51) 0.37 (8.48)
IMP  -0.13 (-1.15)   -0.21 (-2.33)
EXP 0.20 (2.54) 0.25 (3.25)
OVER  -0.0003 (-0.03) 0.006 (0.51)
CONC  -0.0003 (-0.10) 0.0001 (0.06)
R^2 0.998
chi-square(p-value) 4.17 (0.999)
Hausman test on 
Hausman–Taylor–RE versus
Within Estimation of all time-
varying variables
Cobb-Douglass Production function 
Notes:t-values (respectively probability value for the chi^2 statistic) in brackets,
n=1630, 179 firms,time dummies not reported.  
 This table shows that the sign on the co-determination variable is positive and statistically significant 
and his economic influence on the productivity and efficiency is also significant.  
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Appendix 1 Section E   figure 3 and figure 4 Social and employee gains  
 
A. Social Gains  
 
 
B. Employer gains  
 
 
 
(1-p)(UN-UF-πB) 
P(UN-UF+πN-πF) 
(1-p)πb 
p 
0 
P* 
P(πn-πf) 
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Appendix 1 Section F, Table 4 Change in communication through representative staff bodies over the previous 
three years  
Country  Increased Same Decreased 
Not 
Used  
UK 25.3 42.0 4.6 28.1 
France 15.3 75.9 5.1 3.6 
Germany 17.1 67.9 6.5 8.5 
Sweden 22.6 63.3 7.3 6.7 
Spain 28.8 56.9 2.6 11.8 
Denmark 37.0 46.3 4.2 12.5 
the 
Netherlands  35.0 49.9 6.9 8.2 
Italy 24.3 57.0 9.3 9.3 
Norway 5.4 32.3 58.6 3.8 
Switzerland 17.8 34.9 3.6 43.6 
Turkey 11.9 41.5 5.1 41.5 
Finland 34.7 57.3 5.2 2.8 
Greece 10.6 47.5 2.1 39.7 
Austria 19.4 66.0 7.8 6.7 
Belgium 18.8 54.6 8.3 18.3 
Australia  9.4 37.7 9.4 43.5 
New Zealand 14.4 46.4 3.2 36.0 
the USA 11.4 30.6 2.3 55.7 
Canada 20.2 47.8 3.9 28.2 
Slovakia 15.7 42.7 2.0 39.6 
Source: Cranet data(2004)  
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